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GoalsPeople differ. How and why they differ are the fundamental questions for personality psychologists. In
this article we address three levels at which people differ: within individuals, between individuals,
and between groups of individuals. A dynamic model of personality is considered where traits are seen
as rates of change in states in response to environmental cues. Within individuals, motivational and
behavioral states show inertial properties and lead to an analysis of rates of change and latencies of
behavior. Between individuals, the analysis is one of frequency and duration of choices. When individuals
self select into groups reﬂecting shared interests and abilities, the structure of these group differences
reﬂects the consequences of the self selection. Examples of the dynamic model are given for each level
of analysis.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under theCCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Levels of individual differences
People differ. How and why they differ are the fundamental
questions for personality psychologists. In this article we address
three levels at which people differ: within individuals, between
individuals, and between groups of individuals. Although the struc-
ture of differences at each level do not necessarily relate to the
structure of differences at other levels, analysis of the temporal
dynamics of differences suggests some hope for a uniﬁed model.
The study of temporal dynamics in personality is not new (e.g.,
Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982;
Kuhl & Blankenship, 1979; Read et al., 2010; Revelle & Michaels,
1976; Revelle, 1986, chap. 7) but, with few exceptions (Carver,
1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Read et al., 2010), has not had much
impact upon personality theory, perhaps because a disproportion-
ate amount of research has focused on the identiﬁcation of
interindividual personality structure rather than dynamics (Read
et al., 2010). This is unfortunate, for the study of dynamics inte-
grates aspects of choice, persistence, latency, frequency and time
spent into a common framework. As we will show, by understand-
ing temporal dynamics within people, we are able to explainpatterns of choice between people and, by examining the cumula-
tive effect of these choices in terms of time spent, to understand
the ways in which individuals tend to organize into groups accord-
ing to personality traits.
Personality is an abstraction used to describe and explain the
coherent patterning over time and space of affects, cognitions,
desires and the resulting behaviors that an individual experiences
and expresses. People differ from themselves on a moment to
moment basis in that they do not think, feel or act the same all
the time. They change in their feelings, in their thoughts, in their
desires and in their actions. To not change in response to a situa-
tion is maladaptive. When others evaluate our reputation, they
are evaluating our behavior in critical situations and how it
changes across situations. When we think of our identity, we inter-
pret our behavior as the result of our affects and our cognitions.
A primary level of analysis of personality examines the pattern-
ing of ways in which people change. To observers, the dynamic
stream of feelings, thoughts, motives and behavior show a unique
temporal signature for each individual. To an individual differences
theorist, the issues of how and why individuals differ in their pat-
terns are central to the domain of study (Costa & McCrae, 1992a;
Digman, 1990, 1997; Eysenck, 1981; Eysenck & Himmelweit,
1947; Goldberg, 1990; Hogan, 1982; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). To a
biologically minded psychologist, these dynamic processes reﬂect
genetic bases of biological sensitivities to the reinforcement con-
tingencies of the environment (Corr, 2008a; Corr, DeYoung, &
McNaughton, 2013; DeYoung et al., 2010; Smillie, 2008; Smillie,
Cooper, Wilt, & Revelle, 2012; Smillie, Geaney, Wilt, Cooper, &
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dynamic processes may be modeled in terms of the differential
equations of the Dynamics of Action (Atkinson & Birch, 1970;
Atkinson & Raynor, 1974; Revelle, 1986, chap. 7).
Read and Miller and their colleagues (Read, Vanman, & Miller,
1997; Read et al., 2010) have pointed out that most who study
the dynamics of personality within individuals tend not to be con-
cerned with between individual structure, and vice versa. They
(Read et al., 2010) have presented a neural network model that
attempts to integrate dynamics and structure. The ‘‘Cybernetic
Big Five Theory’’ proposed by DeYoung (2015) is an alternative
(although less explicit) dynamic model which attempts to explain
personality structure in terms of dynamic processes. Here we pre-
sent a somewhat different formal model of dynamics that has sim-
ilar goals to these other researchers.
By examining patterns of changewithin individuals, it is possible
to organize the study of personality at a second level – that is, the
analysis of the structure of differences between individuals in the
coherent patterning over time and space within individuals. It is
at this level that conventional trait theorists describe how people
differ from each other in the frequency distribution of their actions
(Fleeson, 2004, 2007a). Differences in sensitivity to the rewarding or
punishing aspects of the environment are discussed at this level in
terms such as reinforcement sensitivity (Corr, 2008a; Corr et al.,
2013; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Smillie, 2008; Smillie, Loxton, &
Avery, 2011, chap. 4). We model differences at this level in terms
of the rates of change in response to situational inputs and how
these differences in rates of change result in differences in fre-
quency and duration of various feelings, thoughts, and actions.
People also differ from each other in terms of important life
choices; examples include choice of college major and career. As
we will show, these choices reﬂect a dynamic interplay of abilities,
interests, and temperament in response to the long term patterns
of reinforcements achieved by each individual. These patterns of
reinforcement, in combination with original differences in sensitiv-
ities to environmental cues can result in group differences that are
structured in a completely different manner than the structure of
personality normally seen at the interindividual level.
1.1. Different levels can be different
Before elaborating on the three levels introduced above, it is
important to acknowledge that each of the levels may differ dra-
matically in both content and structure. Although it is well known
that the structure within one level does not imply anything about
the structure at a different level, this distinction is frequently for-
gotten. Indeed, Cattell (1943, 1946) (see Revelle, 2009) went so
far as to suggest that the dimensions within individuals should
be the same as those between individuals. That analyses at differ-
ent levels should not be confused has been labeled the Yule–
Simpson paradox (Armistead, 2014; Kievit, Frankenhuis,
Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2013; Pearl, 2014; Simpson, 1951; Yule,
1903), the fallacy of ecological correlations (Robinson, 1950) and
the within group–between group problem (Pedhazur, 1997).
Indeed, to confuse the dynamics within individuals with the aver-
ages between individuals is to mistakenly assume ergodicity
(Molenaar, 2004). A very clear exposition of the problem is found
in Kievit et al. (2013).
This has not been a serious problem until recently, because
much of traditional personality research ignored within subject
variation and has examined the structure between individuals
based upon self report inventories reﬂecting one’s average level
of feeling, thoughts, and behavior. But with recent developments
in real time data collection (e.g., Electronically Activated
Recordings (Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006; Mehl, Vazire,
Holleran, & Clark, 2010), paper or electronic diary studies (Green,Rafaeli, Bolger, Shrout, & Reis, 2006; Rafaeli, Rogers, & Revelle,
2007) or cell phone based measures of activity (Wilt, Condon, &
Revelle, 2011a, chap. 10; Wilt, Funkhouser, & Revelle, 2011b)) in
combination with improved understanding of multi-level model-
ing (Bliese, Chan, & Ployhart, 2007; Fleeson, 2007a; West, Ryu,
Kwok, & Cham, 2011) it is now possible to study the individual pat-
terns of dynamics within individuals and relate these patterns to
differences between individuals.
In a multilevel structure, observed correlations across individ-
uals (rxy) may be decomposed into within individual correlations
(rxywp ) and between individual correlations (rxybp ). Similarly, the
correlations between individuals when individuals are members
of different groups reﬂects this within and between group corre-
lational structure. As a simple example, consider the correlation
between cognitive ability and alcohol consumption. Within indi-
viduals, the correlation is negative (alcohol consumption reduces
cognitive performance) but between individuals, those with
higher cognitive ability consume more alcohol (Batty et al.,
2008). At any one occasion, the overall correlation between alco-
hol consumption and cognitive performance (rxy) will reﬂect an
unknown mixture of these two quite different correlations (rxywp
and rxybp ). It is possible to decompose the correlation between
two variables such as these into the between and within person
correlations using the following, straight-forward formula
(adapted from Pedhazur, 1997):
rxy ¼ gxwp  gywp  rxywp þ gxbp  gybp  rxybp
where rxywp is the within person correlation, rxybp is the between per-
son correlation, gxwp is correlation of the data with the within person
values, and gxbp is correlation of the data with the between person
values.
This distinction between correlations at different levels is a fun-
damental part of multilevel modeling and will be important as we
consider models of coherency and differences within-individuals,
between-individuals, and between groups of individuals. That cor-
relations may differ across levels does not imply that they always
will, but the assumption that they do not vary (that they are ergo-
dic) is one that should be tested rather than merely assumed.2. Dynamics within individuals
Dynamic models imply more than the mere observation that
people differ over time for this could just be random ﬂuctuations
around a mean level. Rather, the basic concept of individual
dynamics is that time is a variable which needs to be modeled.
One way to distinguish patterning over time from random varia-
tion around a mean level is to examine the mean square successive
difference (mssd, von Neumann, Kent, Bellinson, & Hart, 1941)
which effectively is a (negative) index of the trial to trial autocor-
relation. A small mssd in comparison to the variance implies that
although behavior may vary across trials, it does not vary much
from one trial to the next.
Inspired by the work of Lewin, Adams, and Zener (1935),
Zeigarnik (1927/1967), Feather (1961); and Atkinson and
Cartwright (1964), the proposition that motivation and action have
inertial properties was added by Atkinson and Birch (1970). That is,
they proposed that a wish persists until satisﬁed and a wish does
not increase unless instigated. (This is, of course, analogous to
Newton’s 1st law of motion that a body at rest will remain at rest,
a body in motion will remain in motion.) By considering motiva-
tions and actions to have inertial properties, it became possible
to model the onset, duration, and offset of activities in terms of a
simple set of differential equations.
Table 1
The basic elements of the dynamics of action. Adapted from Atkinson and Birch
(1970). Action and Negaction Tendencies (T and N, respectively) are instigated by
external forces (F and I) and reduced if the action is ongoing (see Eqs. (1) and (2)).
Approach Avoidance
Action tendencies T Negaction tendency N
Instigating forces F Inhibitory forces I
Consummatory value c Resistance value r
Consummatory forces C Force of resistance R
72 W. Revelle, D.M. Condon / Journal of Research in Personality 56 (2015) 70–81Unfortunately, the theory of the Dynamics of Action (DOA,
Atkinson & Birch, 1970) was a theory before its time. Few psychol-
ogists of the 1970s were prepared to understand differential equa-
tions or develop computer models of difference equations. The
exception seems to be those animal behaviorists studying control
processes (Houston & Sumida, 1985; Toates, 1983). However, with
a simple reparameterization (Revelle, 1986, chap. 7) and modern
software and computational power, the model is much easier to
simulate and examine. This article describes that reparameteriza-
tion (the Cues-Tendency-Action or cta model) of the original the-
ory and explores the power of including temporal dynamics in a
theory of personality at three levels of analysis.
It is important to point out that the DOA-cta models are
models of control in that they have feedback, but differ from
some other models of control (e.g., Carver, 1979; Carver &
Scheier, 1982; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) in that they
do not have a set point or comparator. That is, the typical exam-
ple of a control or cybernetic system is that of a thermostat con-
trolling the temperature in a house, or of a ponderostat for
controlling body weight, or a preferred arousal level to explain
behavioral differences associated with the stimulation seeking
of extraverts (Eysenck, 1967). In contrast, the DOA-cta models
are open control models in the sense used by Bolles (1980).
This distinction will be discussed in more detail when the mod-
els are reviewed.
Recent discussions of the ctamodel include Revelle (2012, chap.
9), which applied the model to the dynamics of emotion (e.g.,
Frijda, 2012, chap. 5); and Fua, Revelle, and Ortony (2010), who
analyzed social behavior in terms of the cta model. To allow the
reader to explore the applications of this model, computer code
simulating the revised model is written in the open source lan-
guage R, (R Core Team, 2014) and is included as the cta function
in the psych package (Revelle, 2014) which is available for down-
load from the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) at
http://cran.r-project.org.
2.1. The original dynamics of action
The dynamics of action was a model of how instigating forces eli-
cited action tendencies which in turn elicited actions (Atkinson &
Birch, 1970). The basic concept was that action tendencies had
inertia. That is, a wish (action tendency) would persist until satis-
ﬁed and would not change without an instigating force. The con-
summatory strength of doing an action was thought in turn to
reduce the action tendency. Forces could either be instigating or
inhibitory (leading to negaction).
Perhaps the simplest example is the action tendency (T) to
eat a pizza. The instigating forces (F) to eat the pizza include
the smell and look of the pizza, and once eating it, the ﬂavor
and texture. However, if eating the pizza, there is also a consum-
matory force (C) which was thought to reﬂect both the strength
(gusto) of eating the pizza as well as some constant consumma-
tory value of the activity (c) (Eqs. (1) and (2)). If not eating the
pizza, but in a pizza parlor, the smells and visual cues combine
to increase the tendency to eat the pizza (Eq. (3)). Once eating it,
however, the consummatory effect is no longer zero, and the
change in action tendency will be a function of both the instigat-
ing forces and the consummatory forces. These will achieve a
balance when instigating forces are equal to the consummatory
forces (Eq. (4)). The asymptotic strength of eating the pizza
reﬂects this balance and does not require a ‘‘set point’’ or ‘‘com-
parator’’. (See Table 1 and Eqs. (1) and (2) for a more formal
description of this behavior.)
The relationship between instigating forces, changes in action
tendencies over time, and actions was described by a simple differ-
ential equation (reminiscent of Newton’s second law)dT ¼ F  C ð1Þ
where
C ¼ cT ð2Þ
and c = 0 if an action is not being done, otherwise c is a function of
the type or perceived value of the action (eating peanuts has a smal-
ler c than eating chocolate cake).
That is, for a set of action tendencies, Ti    Tn, with instigating
forces, Fi    Fn,
dTi ¼ Fi  ciTi if Ti is ongoing
dTi ¼ Fi if Ti is not ongoing

ð3Þ
It is clear from Eq. (3) that an unexpressed but instigated action ten-
dency will grow linearly, but once initiated will achieve an asymp-
totic value when the rate of growth is zero. This occurs when
Fi ¼ ciTi and thus
Ti1 ¼ Fi=ci ð4Þ
The strength of a single action tendency – say, the tendency to eat a
pizza – will increase when instigated by the smell of the pizza but
will then (begin to) diminish once the ﬁrst bite of pizza is con-
sumed. A steady state will be achieved as the effect of the instigat-
ing force is balanced out by the successful consummation. These
differential equations can be simulated as difference equations with
graphical output for the strength of the action tendencies (see
Fig. 1).
Similar to action tendencies are negaction tendencies – tenden-
cies to not want to do something. These grow in response to inhi-
bitory forces, I, and are diminished by the force of resistance, R,
which is, in turn, a function of the cost of resistance, r, and the
strength of the negaction, N.
dN ¼ I  R ¼ I  rN ð5Þ
In contrast to Eq. (3), where action tendencies are reduced only if
the action is happening, Eq. (5) suggests that negaction always
achieves an asymptote, even if the action is not occurring. This is
because effort is required to not do a task, that is to resist doing a
task, thus the force of resistance is always present and negaction
will achieve an asymptotic level of
Ni1 ¼ Ii=ri ð6Þ
A negaction example, analogous to the pizza example, is the com-
mon tendency to avoid unpleasant chores like cleaning. The inhibi-
tory forces (I) related to cleaning one’s toilet are clear – it is an
unpleasant experience relative to other pasttimes. The force of
resistance (R) of toilet-cleaning reﬂects the intensity with which
the experience is unpleasant and a constant value at which the ten-
dency to engage in the behavior is resisted.
The resultant action tendencies are the difference between
Action and Negaction Tir ¼ Ti  Ni. That negaction achieved an
asymptote even if the action was not being done led to the predic-
tion that negaction would delay rather than stop behavior
(Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). It also led
to the concept of ‘‘bottled up action tendencies’’. That is that the
intensity of the unexpressed action could grow higher than it
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Fig. 1. A single action tendency will achieve an asymptotic value of the ratio of
instigating force to consummatory value as corresponding action is expressed and
leads to consummation. Time is expressed in arbitrary units.
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sent. A classic example of this phenomenon is the case of the ﬁerce
elementary school teacher enforcing absolute silence in a class-
room. This works as long as the teacher is present, but results in
chaos if he or she leaves the room. In contrast, a less ﬁerce teacher,
whose classroom might be a little noisier normally, does not bottle
up the desires to talk, and when he/she leaves the room, little
change occurs.
Although a general theory of action, the dynamics of action was
typically considered in an achievement setting. Based upon the
theory of achievement motivation (Atkinson, 1957; Atkinson &
Raynor, 1974), in a setting where the outcome was associated with
effort rather than luck, the instigating force was thought to be a
quadratic function of the subjective expectation of success (ps),
the value of that success which varied according to task difﬁculty
(1 ps), and the need for achievement (Nach):
F ¼ ðpsÞð1 psÞNach ð7Þ
But an achievement setting is also an opportunity for failure and the
change in negaction induced by the task was a function of the inhi-
bitory forces which were in turn a quadratic function of the likeli-
hood of failing, and the pain experienced in failing, and the need
to avoid failure (Naf ). The likelihood of failure is of course just task
difﬁculty, and the pain of failing is greater the easier the task. Thus:
I ¼ ð1 psÞðpsÞNaf ð8Þ
Early suggestions for inertial properties of motivations were
found in the studies by Zeigarnik (1927/1967) as well as by
Feather (1961). An application of the inertial properties of motiva-
tion in an achievement setting was found in an analysis of the
effect of task difﬁculty on performance as a function of the number
of repeated trials (Revelle & Michaels, 1976). This application
demonstrated how two seemingly contradictory models of
on-task effort (Atkinson, 1957; Locke, 1968) could be reconciled
with the addition of inertial properties. Assuming that success
quenches action tendencies but that failure does not, resultant
motivation should grow over successive failures. As task difﬁculty
increases, the likelihood of failure increases and thus there should
be more carryover and growth of motivation as tasks become
harder. The effect of carryover may be expressed in colloquial
terms as ‘‘If at ﬁrst you don’t succeed, try, try again’’.
By separating action tendencies from negaction tendencies, the
dynamic theory had the advantage over earlier work that the mea-
surement of approach and avoidance motivation did not have to be
on the same ratio scale of measurement (Kuhl & Blankenship,
1979). That is, what determined the growth of action tendencies
(Nach) could be measured on a different scale from what deter-
mined negaction (Naf ). This was a marked improvement over prior
work (Atkinson, 1957) suggesting that resultant action tendencies
were a function of the difference between achievement strivings
and fear of failure as well as any extrinsic needs (Text) to do the
task:
Tr ¼ Tach  Taf þ Text ¼ ðNach  Naf Þpsð1 psÞ þ Text ð9ÞTo simulate more than one behavior, Atkinson and Birch (1970)
assumed that action choice between competing action tendencies
simply followed the maximum (resultant) action tendency. Even
with one behavior being modeled, it was always necessary to con-
sider the other, alternative behaviors. Unfortunately, although easy
to specify, the DOA model needed a number of extra parameters to
work: it was necessary to include a decisionmechanism that would
automatically express the greatest action tendency in action.
Complicating this addition, the rule of always doing the action with
the greatest action tendency led to ‘‘chatter’’ in that an actionwould
start and then immediately stop as the action it had supplanted had
a rapidly growing action tendency. To avoid this problem it was
necessary to introduce instigating and consummatory lags, where
switching to a new activitywould not immediately lead to complete
consummation of that need (eating the ﬁrst bite of a piece of pizza
does not immediately satisfy the desire to consume pizza). An sim-
ilar solution to avoid ‘‘dithering’’ (or chatter) in another dynamic
modelwas proposed byHouston and Sumida (1985)who suggested
positive feedback upon initiating an activity.
Although successful computer simulations of the model were
implemented (Atkinson, Bongort, & Price, 1977), few researchers
were interested in testing the implications of computer simula-
tions with studies of human behavior. An important exception
was Blankenship (1987) who directly tested the implications for
a study of achievement. A modiﬁcation of the DOA model which
maintained speciﬁcation of the dynamic properties of behavior
has been developed by Sorrentino (1993) and his colleagues
(Sorrentino, Smithson, Hodson, Roney, & Walker, 2003) who have
applied it to a variety of social contexts.
2.2. A simple reparameterization: the CTA model
To avoid the problems of instigating and consummatory lags and
the need for a decision mechanism, it is possible to reparameterize
the original model in terms of action tendencies and actions
(Revelle, 1986, chap. 7). Rather than specifying inertia for action ten-
dencies and a choice rule of always expressing the dominant action
tendency, it is useful to distinguish between action tendencies (t)
and the actions (a) themselves and to have actions aswell as tenden-
cies having inertial properties. By separating tendencies from
actions, and giving them both inertial properties, we avoid the
necessity of a lag parameter, and by making the decision rule one
of mutual inhibition, the process is perhaps easier to understand.
In an environment which affords cues for action (c), cues enhance
action tendencies (t) which in turn strengthen actions (a). This leads
to two differential equations, one describing the growth and decay
of action tendencies (t), the other of the actions themselves (a).
dt ¼ Sc Ca ð10Þ
da ¼ Et Ia ð11Þ
To continue our pizza example, the smell and appearance of the
pizza is a cue cwhich increases the desire or tendency (t) to eat the
pizza. This desire increases the strength of the eating action a
which, when large enough will overcome the inhibition of other
actions (e.g., drinking, talking, etc.). c, t and a are vectors (perhaps
of different dimensionality), one of which (c) is a function of the
environment, and two of which (t and a) change dynamically.
The parameters S, C, E, and I are matrices representing the connec-
tion strengths between cues and action tendencies (S), action ten-
dencies and actions (E), the consummatory strength of actions
upon action tendencies (C), and the inhibition of one action over
another (I). They are speciﬁed as initial inputs but could them-
selves change with learning and reinforcement (Corr, 2008b;
Revelle, 2008, chap. 18). That is, while successfully completing an
action reduces the immediate tendency to do the action, the
Fig. 2. A simpliﬁed model of the cues, tendency, action (cta) model. Cues stimulate
action tendencies which in turn excite actions. Actions may be mutually inhibitory
and also reduce action tendencies. Extensions of this model allow for learning by
changing the stimulation, excitation, and inhibition weights. These longer term
learning paths are shown as reinforcement paths and reﬂect the reinforcing effects
of successful actions upon the S and E matrices. Mutually compatible activities do
not inhibit each other, and thus have inhibition strength of 0. The inhibition effect
of an action upon itself reﬂects the cost of doing the action. Not shown in the ﬁgure,
but implied by the use of matrices, are cross connections between cuesi and
tendenciesi–j and similar cross connections between tendencies and actions, and
consummations of actions on different tendencies.
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between the action and the tendency and the tendency and the
action are presumably increased. The model, although expressed
in Eqs. (10) and (11) may best be understood as a box diagram of
the ﬂow of control (Fig. 2). Not shown in Fig. 2, but implied by
the use of matrices for S, E, C and I are the connections between
cues and different action tendencies, and between action tenden-
cies and different actions. Thus, cue1 can excite tendency2, and
action3 can reduce the desire for another action tendency1.
If just a single action tendency and the resulting action are cued,
the result is an action tendency and resulting action similar to that
predicted by the dynamics of action and shown in Fig. 1 as mod-
eled by the cta function in the psych package (Revelle, 2014).
Actions that are not mutually inhibitory both rise and fall indepen-
dently of each other (Fig. 3 upper panel represents three different
action tendencies in response to cue strengths of 4 (black/solid), 2
(blue/dashed), and 1 (red/dotted), with the diagonal of the con-
summation matrix set to .05, .02, and .03 and the self inhibition
values of .09, .05, and .02). Cue strength (c) is reﬂected in the initial
growth rate of action tendencies and of actions as well as the
asymptotic level. The consummation parameter, C, affects the
asymptotic level as well as the frequency and speed of dampening
of the action tendencies and thus of the actions. The self inhibition
parameter, I, affects the asymptotic level and the dampening of
action tendencies and indirectly of the dampening of the action
tendencies (Fig. 3 lower panel).
Although somewhat similar in structure to other cybernetic
control theory models (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; Miller et al.,
1960), the models differ in that there is no set point or comparison
level in the cta model. Inspection of Fig. 2 or of Eqs. (10) and (11)
shows the lack of a comparator process or a set point. Stability is
achieved when da ¼ Et Ia ¼ 0 and dt ¼ Sc Ca ¼ 0, that is, when
the stimulation from the cues is matched by the consummation of
the actions. A similar process has been reported for eating behavior
and weight gain. In the presence of ad lib food and no need to work
to get it, rats put on weight. But if access to food requires effort, or
if the palatability of the food is decreased, eating is reduced and
weigh gain is decreased (Bolles, 1980; Mrosovsky & Powley, 1977).
The model becomes much more interesting when we consider
the case of mutually incompatible (mutually inhibitory) actions
(Houston & Sumida, 1985). If a person can do only one of a set of
actions at a time, then, although the tendencies or desires to do
the actions run off in parallel, the actual expression of action runs
off serially (Fig. 4). A memorable example of incompatible
responses is found in the newt, which copulates under water, but
breaths at the surface. By increasing the oxygen content of the
atmosphere, the length of each copulatory bout is prolonged
(Halliday, 1980; Halliday & Houston, 1991). Not quite as dramatic
is the said inability of Gerald Ford to walk and chew gum at the
same time. Similar incompatibilities involving the allocation of
attention include the detrimental effect of talking on a phone while
driving, or checking email while working on a manuscript.
The power of a dynamic model is that it predicts change of
behavior even in a constant environment where the instigating
cues are not changing. With mutually incompatible actions, action
tendencies can all be instigated by the environment but only one
action will occur at a time. Action tendencies resulting in actions
will then be reduced while other action tendencies rise. This leads
to a sequence of actions occurring in series, even though the action
tendencies are in parallel.
2.3. Exploring within subject dynamics
When originally proposed, the Dynamics of Action was hard to
study except by computer simulation and by arguments based
upon aggregated behavior. The DOA theory was primarily used tomodel achievement behavior in the face of success and failure
(Kuhl & Blankenship, 1979; Revelle & Michaels, 1976) and data
were aggregated across simulated subjects. But, with the introduc-
tion of daily diaries of mood and behavior (Green et al., 2006), and
more importantly, telemetric methods (Wilt et al., 2011a, chap. 10)
and better computational methods (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2014; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000), it is now possible to study
within subject variation in affect, behavior, and cognition
(Fleeson, 2007b; Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002; Rafaeli et al.,
2007; Wilt et al., 2011b). When the structure of affect is examined
within individuals, the results are strikingly different from that
found between individuals. The well known two dimensional
structure between individuals of Energetic Arousal and Tense
Arousal (Schimmack & Reisenzein, 2002; Thayer, 1989; Thayer,
2000) or of Positive and Negative Affect (Watson & Tellegen,
1985; Watson & Tellegen, 1999) (see also Rafaeli & Revelle, 2006)
shows reliable individual differences in structure within individu-
als (Rafaeli et al., 2007).
Rafaeli et al. (2007) found that the correlation within subjects
over time between positive and negative affect (and between tense
and energetic arousal) showed reliable individual differences in
affective synchrony. In other words, individuals were reliably syn-
chronous (showed positive correlations), asynchronous (no corre-
lation) or de-synchronous (negative correlations). Further,
‘‘[n]euroticism, extraversion, sociability, and impulsivity – major
personality dimensions often associated with affective experience
– were not associated with synchrony’’ (Rafaeli et al., 2007 p
921). In a subsequent study examining the cognitive interpretation
of situations, although the between individual correlation of ener-
getic and tense arousal was the prototypical null, the correlation
between energetic and tense arousal within subjects was a reliable
individual difference that reﬂected the level of challenge vs. threat
perceived by the subjects (Wilt et al., 2011b).
What occurs within individuals is the complex interplay of
affects, behaviors, cognitions and desires rising and falling over
time and we observe the correlations of levels of these measures
within individuals over time. Within individuals, the basic param-
eters are rates of change: how rapidly do action tendencies grow,
how rapidly do they decay, and how do some actions inhibit
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Fig. 3. Three action tendencies representing three compatible actions. Because all three actions are mutually compatible, they each achieve their asymptotic value. Within
the cta function, the parameters are set so that the solid black line represents cue strength of 4, self inhibition of .09, and consummation of .05. The dashed blue line
represents cue strength of 2, an inhibition strength of .05, and a consummation of .02. The dashed red line represents a cue of 1, I of .02 and C of .03. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 4. Three mutually incompatible activities inhibit each other and thus their respective action tendencies rise and fall over time. The ﬂow of action tendencies run off in
parallel, but because of inhibition, the actions occur sequentially. In the cta function, cues are set to be 4 (black/solid line), 2 (blue/dashed line), and 1 (red/dotted line). By
default, all actions are mutually incompatible, and thus the I matrix is set to all 1s, with a diagonal of .05, the consummation matrix is diagonal with values of .05. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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reﬂects differential sensitivities to the environmental contingen-
cies of reward and punishment while the speed at which action
tendencies decay reﬂects differential rates of habituation/adapta
tion/consummation. That is, what is stable within an individual
is the rate at which he or she adapts to the environment.
Matrices of stable traits (S, E, C, I) are the derivatives of states (c,
t, a) (see Table 2).
Most importantly, the predictions of the cta or DOA models are
that motivation carries over from trial to trial, and that effort will
increase following failure but be quenched by success. This obser-
vation is one of the more compelling predictions of the cta/DOA
models. Contrary to simple reinforcement theories, the immediate
effect of success is to reduce effort on the subsequent trial, while
the immediate effect of failure is to increase effort on the subse-
quent trial (Revelle & Michaels, 1976). This is clearly an adaptive
response, because success signals that less effort is required, butfailure signals that more effort is required. Thus, trial by trial there
is a negative autocorrelation as individuals respond to the out-
comes but over the longer term, a positive autocorrelation as indi-
viduals acquire expertise and interest. A somewhat similar
prediction follows from the model of passive goal guidance
(PGG) which considers the unconscious effect on goal seeking
behavior of prior outcomes (Laran & Janiszewski, 2009). The longer
term effect of reinforcement is to modify the S, E, C, and Imatrices
to reﬂect the pattern of successes and failures. That is, although a
success will have a short term quenching effect on effort, over
the long term, success is reinforcing and increases the likelihood
of engaging in an activity.
3. Between individual differences
Dynamic models can be applied to differences between individ-
uals, not to predict trial to trial dynamics, but rather to model
Table 2
The basic elements of the cta model. The environmental input to the system (the
cues) are variable as the individual interacts with the world. The strength of these
cues upon action tendencies is moderated by the connection strengths in the
stimulation matrix. The resulting tendencies have inertial properties (increasing
when stimulated, decreasing when consummated). The action tendencies induce
actions through the excitation connections. Actions also have inertial tendencies but
are reduced by other actions as well doing the action (self inhibition). The connections
of the matrices may change over time to reﬂect learning in a long term response to
the reinforcement of actions.
Dynamic vectors Stable matrices
Cues c Stimulation strength S
Action Tendencies t Excitation E
Actions a Consummation C
Inhibition I
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differences in time spent doing various activities. We do not
observe growth rates, but we do observe frequencies, latencies,
and persistence. Perhaps most notably, we learn to recognize the
patterning of behaviors, feelings, thoughts, and desires within our-
selves and others.
Whether one focuses on the behavioral dimensions of approach,
avoidance, and inhibition (Corr, 2008a; Eysenck, 1990; Gray &
McNaughton, 2000; Smillie, 2014) or the ﬁve/six dimensions
reﬂecting individual differences in self description examined by
Ashton, Lee, and Goldberg (2007), Digman (1990), Goldberg
(1990), McCrae et al. (1997) and numerous others, one is taking
average levels of affects, behaviors, cognitions, and desires
(Hilgard, 1980; Ortony, Norman, & Revelle, 2005; Scherer, 1995;
Wilt & Revelle, 2009, chap. 3).
We prefer to focus not on the average levels, but rather the rates
of change of these levels. Acting extraverted is not always being
talkative, but it is being talkative in the presence of others. How
rapidly one initiates a conversation, how long one persists in the
conversation are the appropriate measures of extraversion.
Similarly, trait anxiety is not always being anxious, but is a ten-
dency to become state anxious more rapidly, in more situations,
and to have a slower decay rate of that state anxiety
(Gilboa-Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000; Oehlberg, Revelle, &
Mineka, 2012).
These average levels of what one tends to do may be distin-
guished from maximum levels of what one can do. This distinction
is most obvious when considering cognitive ability. We have
known since Spearman (1904) that it is almost impossible to ﬁnd
a cognitive task that does not correlate with other cognitive tasks.
The dominant models in cognitive abilities research (Carroll, 1993;
Horn & Cattell, 1966; Johnson & Bouchard, 2005; McGrew, 2009)
support the notion of general cognitive ability (‘‘g’’) though the
manner in which they organize the abilities below this highest
level varies considerably. But ability is not just a high score on
an ability test, it is succeeding on many daily tasks and even leads
to survival, for life is an intelligence test with many subtests
(Gottfredson, 1997). Not only does ability relate to the risk of mor-
tality throughout one’s life (Deary, 2008) it is stable: ability mea-
sured at age 11 correlates .67 with ability measured 79 years
later (Deary, Pattie, & Starr, 2013). Just as we think of trait
extraversion as the speed and persistence of responding to others,
in terms of the cta model, we interpret trait ability as the speed at
which one can move through a problem space, from the initial con-
ﬁguration to the solution. Because schooling presents a number of
cognitive challenges to be surpassed, for the same level of educa-
tion, there will be a high correlation between knowledge or crys-
tallized intelligence (gc) and speed of processing or ﬂuid
intelligence ðgf Þ. But once formal education is ﬁnished how onespends one processing abilities will vary across people and the
ðgcÞ  ðgf Þ correlation will diminish.
If temperament is what you usually do, and ability is what you
can do, interests are what you like to do and how you spend your
time. Just as the dimensions of temperament may be analyzed
through factor analysis, so can the dimensions of interest. At a very
high level, interests can be grouped into the dimensions of people
vs. things and of facts versus ideas (Prediger & Vansickle, 1992).
These high level dimensions themselves can be decomposed into
the lower level facets of speciﬁc interests known as the RIASEC
model (Holland, 1959, 1996).3.1. Categorization of differences as temperaments, abilities, and
interests
Until the mid-1950s, it was the tradition in personality research
to integrate ability, temperament, and interests (Cattell, 1946;
Eysenck & Himmelweit, 1947; Kelly & Fiske, 1950). While this
has continued among many European psychologists, there has
been a tendency among American personality psychologists to
focus on dimensions of temperament to the exclusion of ability
or interests. Thus, there has been an emphasis upon the Giant
3/Big 5/Big 6 dimensions of temperament without considering
how these relate to dimensions of ability or interests. Exceptions
to this general rule include Ackerman (1997), Ackerman and
Heggestad (1997), Deary, Whiteman, Starr, Whalley, and Fox
(2004), Deary (2008), Deary et al. (2013), DeYoung (2015),
Ferriman, Lubinski, and Benbow (2009), Gottfredson (1997),
Lubinski and Benbow (2000), Lubinski, Webb, Morelock, and
Benbow (2001), von Stumm, Chamorro-Premuzic, and Ackerman
(2011) and they are notable for their rarity. We follow the example
of Ackerman (1997) and von Stumm et al. (2011) by preferring to
focus on the integration of these three domains, as this approach
is consistent with the theoretical work of Plato (Hilgard, 1980;
Scherer, 1995) and early personality scholars (Cattell, 1946;
McDougall, 1923). These domains may be denoted by the labels
Temperament, Abilities and Interests (Condon, 2014; Revelle,
Wilt, & Condon, 2011, chap. 1).
The temperament domain encompasses those individual differ-
ences which are typically researched by modern personality psy-
chologists. While the Big Five model enjoys wide acceptance as a
relatively inclusive descriptive framework for the temperamental
differences, several alternative models have been proposed as well.
To a substantial extent, these alternative models merely reﬂect
higher or lower level descriptions of the same multi-dimensional
universe of individual differences. For example, the tendency to
rely upon ﬁve-factor structures does not preclude the possibility
of organizing the same individual differences with more (Ashton
et al., 2007; Costa & McCrae, 1992b; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson,
2007) or fewer dimensions (DeYoung, 2010; Digman, 1997;
Saucier, 2009). No matter how many dimensions are deemed most
appropriate for a given context, it is generally the case that these
individual differences can also be evaluated according to the
degree to which they describe an individual’s stable tendencies
in terms of affect, cognition, desire, and behavior (Wilt, 2014;
Wilt & Revelle, 2009, chap. 3) Thus, it is important if we can model
these between individual differences using our cta approach.
The cognitive ability domain, which is perhaps the oldest line of
research among modern personality psychologists, encompasses
individual differences in cognitive abilities ranging from executive
functioning and attention to more traditional measures of intelli-
gence. Unlike the temperamental differences, cognitive abilities
are typically measured with ‘‘maximal performance’’ tasks that
incorporate items or tests that span a range of difﬁculties. It should
also be noted that individual differences in cognitive ability are not
W. Revelle, D.M. Condon / Journal of Research in Personality 56 (2015) 70–81 77only a function of the narrowly deﬁned abilities which relate to
speciﬁc tasks (e.g., spatial navigation or verbal reasoning) but also
differential contributions between crystallized and ﬂuid ability.
Research on conative individual differences (i.e., differences in
desires, motivations, volition and striving) is most frequently con-
ducted through the assessment of interests, especially vocational
interests. The dominant interests framework, known as the
RIASEC model of vocational interests (Holland, 1959, 1996), orga-
nizes both interests and jobs according to six categories (and
related scales) – Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social,
Enterprising, and Conventional. The framework itself allows for
hierarchical organization of speciﬁc occupations which can be
grouped according to shared basic interest categories and these
in turn can be grouped at a higher level of six general interest fac-
tors (Armstrong, Smith, Donnay, & Rounds, 2004). In other words,
the basic interests may be seen as equivalent to the facet level of
the Big Five in the temperament domain. It has also been suggested
that the six factor structure can be further simpliﬁed to two dimen-
sions which are known as data/ideas and people/things
(Armstrong, Allison, & Rounds, 2008; Prediger & Vansickle, 1992).
It should be noted that the assessment of vocational interests as
a proxy for conation is practical but inadequate. It does not typi-
cally include the assessment of preferences, values, avocational
interests or pastimes. More generally, the assessment of conative
differences is hampered by the fact that speciﬁc activities are often
idiosyncratically rooted in previous experience and are generally
pursued sequentially, with varying degrees of intensity, in accor-
dance with circumstantial factors. In other words, the use of inter-
ests to capture conative differences is problematic because (1)
interest in a behavior or activity is often dependent on knowledge
about that activity and (2) interest does not reﬂect the intensity
with which an activity is pursued, the enjoyment derived from it,
or the circumstantial factors which may impede or demand the
pursuit of any given activity (e.g., socioeconomic status, cultural
inﬂuences, etc.). Related to these issues is the fact that the various
aspects of conation are seemingly quite distinct: the assessment of
interests provides a means of describing one’s preferences; motiva-
tion is generally framed as a measure of intensity (Carver & White,
1994; Gray & McNaughton, 2000), goals and values are often
framed as trait-like heuristics that individuals use to navigate
through the stream of choices in life (Liberman, Molden, Idson, &
Higgins, 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2005, chap. 13; Peterson &
Seligman, 2004). In essence, it seems that the conative domain is
perhaps more sensitive than the temperament and ability domains
to variability in the nature of action tendencies at the within indi-
vidual level.
The simple categorization of temperament, abilities and inter-
ests is a useful heuristic but does not capture the complex inter-
play of these three domains. Some of our prior work has
examined the distinction between ability and performance as they
relate to temperament (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Revelle,
1993). That what one can do (ability or competence) is not neces-
sarily shown by what one does has been known since at least
Tolman and Honzik (1930) who studied the effect of reward on
maze performance. With the same number of learning trials,
non-rewarded rats take far longer to run a maze than when given
a reward. Complex cognitve performance also differs as a function
of the experimental condition. The impulsivity component of
extraversion (Revelle, 1997) shows systematic interactions with
caffeine induced stress and time of day in its effect on cognitive
performance. The performance on complex reasoning tasks of less
impulsive individuals is hindered by caffeine in the morning, but
facilitated in the evening, while that of more impulsive individuals
is facilitated in the morning and hindered in the evening (Revelle,
Humphreys, Simon, & Gilliland, 1980). In a separate set of studies,
the poor cognitive performance of highly anxious individuals wasprobably due to too much time spent in off task thoughts and
not enough time spent on task (Leon & Revelle, 1985; Wine, 1971).
3.2. Modeling social behavior at two levels: cta and TAI
The expression of social behavior at the between individual TAI
level is typically construed as an example of extraversion. Social
interaction can also be modeled using the cta model. If, for exam-
ple, a group of four individuals gather together, each individual in
the group will have a desire (action tendency) which reﬂects their
interest in talking. When one person in the group is talking, the
others are generally inhibited. At the between individual level, dif-
ferences in the desire to talk (and the willingness to remain inhib-
ited from talking) are a function of temperamental differences, but
these might also be viewed as within individual sensitivities
(growth rates) to cues for talking. When one person in the group
is talking, the extent to which others are inhibited will reﬂect their
sensitivity to other cues (e.g., the desire to listen, understand, not
interrupt, etc.) Desires to talk run off in parallel, but behaviors
are sequential. Differences in growth rates result in differences in
latency and persistence. Fig. 5 demonstrates how such an interac-
tion might unfold by plotting the action tendencies for talking for
four individuals over 5000 arbitrary units of time. Note that, in this
example, one person talks frequently while another is much less
involved; these two might be viewed as extraverted and intro-
verted, respectively.
An important point from this simulation is the recognition that
both the DOA and cta models involve temporal measures (latency
and persistence) which are functions of the choices available.
Contexts differ in the sets of alternative activities. We simulated
talking versus listening (not talking), but one could also think of
each situation as offering a range of alternatives. Consider the con-
text of a ‘‘lively party’’. To some, this is an opportunity to talk to
many different people, to others the chance to talk to a few special
friends, to others the opportunity to put a lamp shade on their
head. The choices made, and the latency and persistence of the var-
ious action tendencies, are all functions of cue strength for those
activities, and inhibitory effects from other activities.
That the situation is not just the physical environment, but also
the social context may be seen when we simulate four different
groups of individuals (Table 3). When the group consists of all
introverts, or of all extraverts, everyone shares equally in the
amount of time spent talking. But when the groups differ in the
range of introversion–extraversion within the group, the extraverts
will tend to dominate the conversation. Data supporting this pre-
diction were reported by Antill (1974) who examined the interac-
tive effect of group size and introversion/extraversion upon talking
behavior. The effect of group composition on the frequency distri-
bution of extraverted behaviors also is compatible with Fleeson’s
analysis of the relationships between state and trait measures of
extraversion (Fleeson, 2004, 2007a).
By focusing on the frequency domain, we can integrate the
average level of behavior analyzed by most individual differences
psychologists with our dynamic models. For the ctamodel predicts
differences in frequency of feelings and actions as a function of the
latent rates of change parameters that we prefer. Extraverts, across
situations, will have shorter latencies and greater persistence in
social behaviors than will more introverted people. Similarly, con-
scientiousness can be seen as a delay in onset of inappropriate
behaviors, and a persistence of appropriate behaviors.
Neuroticism is a measure of the speed and generalization of reac-
tion to stressful or threatening environments, agreeableness is a
sensitivity and rapid response to the cues exhibited by others,
openness is the speed, frequency, and duration of engaging in
intellectually challenging tasks. This approach is reminiscent of
that of Denissen and Penke (2008) and Penke, Denissen, and
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Fig. 5. Simulation of 4 individuals differing in their excitation of a tendency. Default values for the cta function are used. Black/solid has a cue strength of 8, blue/dashed 4,
red/dotted 2 and green/dotted 1. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
Hypothetical amount of time spent talking and the hypothetical intensity of the
talking behavior in four different groups of four individuals. The ﬁrst group is
composed of four introverted individuals who share equally in the conversation, but
engage with low average levels of action. The second group, composed of four
extraverts also share equally in the conversation, but talk with much more intensity.
The third group, a mix of two introverts and two extraverts shows how the amount of
time spent talking decreases for the introverts as the extraverts take 50% more than
their share. Although the introverts talk less, they still talk with the same intensity as
in the ﬁrst group. Similarly, the talkative extraverts act with the same intensity as
they did in the second group. The ﬁnal case is when people cover the whole range of
introversion/extraversion. Simulation done using the cta function in psych with cue
values as speciﬁed and running over 10,000 ‘‘time units’’.
Talking behavior
Subject Cue
strength
Time
spent
Frequency Av.
tendencies
Av.
actions
Four introverts
I1 0.95 0.24 16 6 80
I2 1.00 0.25 16 5 80
I3 1.05 0.24 16 5 83
I4 1.10 0.27 16 6 79
Four extraverts
E1 3.95 0.25 16 21 322
E2 4.00 0.24 15 26 335
E3 4.05 0.25 16 20 313
E4 4.10 0.26 15 23 297
Two introverts, two extraverts
I1 0.95 0.11 8 14 167
I2 1.00 0.13 9 14 150
E1 4.05 0.37 22 15 215
E2 4.10 0.38 21 15 210
Full range of introversion–extraversion
IE1 1.00 0.17 11 9 123
IE2 2.00 0.21 14 12 182
IE3 3.00 0.28 18 14 208
IE4 4.00 0.34 19 16 230
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tional cues.
Traits, in the cta model are captured as rates of change (dc and
dt) (Eqs. (10) and (11)). But these in turn reﬂect the stable connec-
tions expressed in the S, E, C and I matrices. It is the structure of
those matrices that should be related to the stable individual dif-
ferences we know as traits. This conceptualization implies that
we need to consider not just average levels of affect and behavior,
but latencies, persistence and intensity of the behavior as well aschoice between behavior. Speed of onset of an activity is related
to the S matrix, while persistence will be related to both S and C
as well as the inhibitory strength I of other actions.
4. Group differences as the consequence of individual choices
Dynamic models at a longer span reﬂect changes in interests
and goals to reﬂect past histories of reinforcement. Over the long
run, the connection strengths between cues and action tendencies,
S, and between action tendencies and actions, E, will change to
reﬂect experience. The cta model is one of motivation and choice;
it involves choice between incompatible outcomes. Students who
ﬁnd a topic challenging enough to be interesting, and who have
the required mix of temperament and ability to do well, will
become progressively more interested in the topic. Others, who
do not have the temperament or ability needed for that topic will
ﬁnd other topics more reinforcing. Over time, people will gravitate
to certain college majors, occupations, or ways of behaving as a
consequence of their histories of reinforcement. Over a longer time
period, this will lead to group differences in the mean levels of
temperament and ability traits in different college majors. But, as
at the individual level, these choices are themselves mutually
incompatible. For time is a ﬁnite resource and time spent in the
lab doing chemistry is time not spent socializing. Time spent in
doing volunteer activities is time not spent studying business
administration. Such patterns of histories of different choices will
result in different patterns of experiences and reinforcement which
will in turn lead to trait constellations that reﬂect these choices.
Feldman and Newcomb (1969) referred to this effect as accentua-
tion, where small initial differences in interests and attitudes were
accentuated by exposure to college.
In a large scale, web based assessment of temperament and
ability characteristics associated with different occupations and
college majors, we have shown (Revelle, Condon, & Vancouver,
2012) striking differences in the level of cognitive ability (as
assessed by the ICAR measure of ability (Condon & Revelle,
2014)) and the structure of the Big Five temperament measures
as a function of college major. Rather than the conventional
between individual structure showing independence of the dimen-
sions of temperament and the measure of ability, when aggregated
at the level of the college major, ability was highly negatively cor-
related with Extraversion and Agreeableness. In terms of intellec-
tual ability, students who went into physics were 1.01 standard
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were .70 standard deviations above those who went into medical
assisting. But this pattern was reversed for Extraversion and partic-
ularly, Agreeableness. Although at the individual level, E, A and
ability were independent, at the aggregate level across 91 majors
with more than 100 students each, the median (absolute) correla-
tions were .72 between ability and temperament measures.
Interestingly, given by DeYoung’s (2015) discussion about ability
and the intellect subdomain of Openness, the between individual
correlation was .17 between cognitive ability and intellect/open-
ness, but this correlation increased to .71 at the aggregate level.
That is, those students who go into the more intellectually chal-
lenging majors also report more interest in intellectual activity
and less agreeableness.5. Analytic tools
A revolution in analytic techniques has occurred during the past
few years. We no longer are constrained to use proprietary soft-
ware to analyze data, nor are we constrained to analyze data at
one level of analysis. With the development of multi-level model
procedures and dynamic data collection, it is now possible for any-
one to model data within and between levels. Open source soft-
ware packages available in the R data analysis system (R Core
Team, 2014) allow for the identiﬁcation of Simpson’s paradox
(Kievit & Epskamp, 2012), to do multilevel analysis (Bates et al.,
2014; Bliese, 2009), to do factor analyses at the individual and
group level (Revelle, 2014), to do dynamic factor analysis
(Molenaar, 1985; Molenaar & Nesselroade, 2009), and to model
the dynamic processes represented by the cta model (Revelle,
2014). What was once a theory too complicated to model has
now become one open to test and veriﬁcation.6. Conclusion
We started this paperwith the simple premise that people differ.
They differ within themselves over time, they differ between indi-
viduals cross sectionally, and they form into groups over time that
differ in their structure. We have tried to show that ‘‘how’’ and
‘‘why’’ people differ may be considered in terms of the same basic
dynamic model that considers motives and behaviors to have iner-
tial properties and that can bemodeled dynamically. These dynam-
ics are not ergodic, in that the average outcome does not reﬂect the
basic processes at the individual level, nor is the structure of group
differences just the average of the structure of the individuals. We
believe that personality needs to be conceived at multiple temporal
durations. At the individual level, the short term dynamics over sec-
onds to days reﬂect the personal signature of an individual. Over
longer periods of days to months, we see the typical structure of
individual differences. However, when the patterns of individual
choices are accumulated over the long term, over a period of years,
the structure between groups is different yet again.
The study of personality needs to be considered at multiple
levels of analysis: within and between individuals, and between
groups of individuals. It also needs to be considered at different
temporal frequencies, from the high frequencies within individuals
to the long term tides of aggregated behavior. We hope that we
have shown that it is time for theorists of personality and individ-
ual differences to realize the power of formal models implemented
in open source software.
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